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ABSTRACT 
Recently, the Federal Circuit in Knorr-Bremse v. Dana 
overruled almost twenty years of precedent by striking down the 
adverse inference doctrine, which had created a negative 
presumption against any alleged patent infringer for failing to 
obtain and disclose a patent opinion letter at trial.  The decision, 
while strongly supported by numerous intellectual property and 
business associations, has created uncertainty for patent attorneys 
regarding the use of opinion letters in litigation and the acceptable 
methods for proving willful infringement.  This iBrief addresses two 
specific questions left unanswered by the decision.  It concludes 
that (1) Federal Circuit precedent strongly suggests that the 
plaintiff may inform the fact-finder that the alleged infringer failed 
to consult legal counsel, and (2) willful infringement findings can 
probably be avoided even absent an opinion from counsel, as long 
as the alleged infringer makes a showing of good faith intent to 
avoid infringement. 
INTRODUCTION  
¶1 Businesses and universities are placing greater and greater 
importance on creating and defending intellectual property.2  This increased 
attention to intellectual capital, particularly patents, is reflected by dramatic 
increases in the number of patents issued3 and patent lawsuits filed in the 
United States over the last several years.4  Another indication of the 
increasing value associated with patents is the size of recent patent 
infringement verdicts.  Many infringement verdicts today extend into the 
                                                     
1 Joshua Stowell is a second year J.D. candidate at Duke University School of 
Law.  He graduated with distinction from the University of Washington with a 
BS in Chemical Engineering.  The author would like to thank Professor Arti K. 
Rai, Julian Wong and Nancy Stowell for their comments. 
2 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 28 
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004). 
3 Id. (“The number of U.S. patents issued to both U.S. and foreign entities nearly 
tripled from 66,290 in 1980 to 184,172 in 2001.”). 
4 Id. at 32 (“The number of patent lawsuits settled in or disposed by federal 
district courts doubled between 1988 and 2001, from 1,200 to nearly 2,400.”). 
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millions of dollars.5  These multi-million dollar awards often result from the 
addition of enhanced damages to already substantial actual damages.  
However, the infringer is only liable for enhanced damages if the fact-finder 
determines the infringement was willful.6  Unsurprisingly, virtually every 
infringement charge comes coupled with a willfulness charge due to the 
possibility of obtaining greatly enhanced damages.7  
¶2 The Supreme Court has defined willfulness as “conduct that is not 
merely negligent.”8  In the context of a patent case, this means the infringer 
has knowledge of an existing patent he is likely to infringe by the 
development of his own product.9  The purposes of finding willful 
infringement and the subsequent award of enhanced damages are meant to 
punish infringers for deliberately breaking the law10 and to make the policy 
statement that patent infringement is “disfavored.”11  Deterrence for willful 
behavior by infringers can include treble damages12 and an award of 
attorney fees.13  
¶3 However, in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. 
Dana Corp.,14 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
made willful infringement easier for infringing defendants to conceal by 
eliminating one of the primary tools employed by courts and plaintiff’s 
attorneys to prove willfulness – adverse inference.  Prior to Knorr-Bremse, 
failure by a party accused of infringement to either obtain or disclose an 
                                                     
5 See e.g., Eric Young, Patents Spell a Hot Market – For Lawyers, EAST BAY 
BUSINESS TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003 (“Consider recent judgments against eBay Inc. 
for $29 million, Microsoft Corp. for $521 million and Research in Motion Ltd. 
for $53 million.”), available at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2003/09/15/focus4.html. 
6 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]his court 
has approved [enhanced damages] where the infringer acted in wanton disregard 
of the patentee’s patent rights, that is, where the infringement is willful.”); Ira V. 
Heffan, Willful Patent Infringement, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 115, 119 (1997) (“An 
infringer is liable for actual damages even if the infringement was unintentional, 
but the infringer is not liable for enhanced damages without a finding of 
willfulness”). 
7 Heffan, supra note 6, at 115-16. 
8 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 
U.S. 128, 133 (1988)). 
9 State Indus., Inc. v. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
10 Heffan, supra note 6, at 118.  
11 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342. 
12 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three 
times the amount found or assessed”). 
13 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (“The court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).  
14 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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opinion letter15 from legal counsel resulted in an adverse inference that such 
an opinion would have been negative for the infringing party.16  Such a 
presumptive finding by the court often damaged the accused infringer’s case 
and resulted in a finding of willful infringement.17  In Knorr-Bremse, 
however, the court explicitly overruled its prior precedent and held “that no 
adverse inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have been 
unfavorable flows from an alleged infringer’s failure to obtain or produce 
an exculpatory opinion of counsel.”18 
¶4 The decision in Knorr-Bremse to eliminate adverse inference, while 
widely advocated by many intellectual property groups,19 created a number 
of uncertainties for patent litigators.  Commentators seem convinced the 
decision will change patent law,20 but many are unsure how the changes will 
play out.  As Judge Dyk pointed out in his partial dissent in Knorr-Bremse, 
the majority provided little guidance about the future role of opinion letters 
in patent litigation.21  The majority itself mentioned, but failed to resolve, 
the question of “whether the trier of fact, particularly the jury, can or should 
                                                     
15 Opinion letters, or exculpatory opinions, are legal memoranda typically 
created by patent attorneys to advise clients about the “validity, enforceability, 
and infringement of a patent.” David O. Taylor, Wasting Resources: Reinventing 
the Scope of Waiver Resulting from the Advice-of-Counsel Defense to a Charge 
of Willful Patent Infringement, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 319, 326 (2004).  In 
order for the opinion letter to be valid, “the opinion must be competent, timely 
obtained and reasonably relied upon by the accused infringer.”  Thomas 
Presson, Knorr-Bremse and Questions About Production of an Exculpatory 
Legal Opinion and the Adverse Inference, 44 IDEA 409, 417 (2004). 
16 See, e.g., Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (holding defendant’s silence on the subject of legal advice warranted a 
finding that the advice would have been negative). 
17 See William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and 
Addressing the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful 
Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 419 (“[Adverse] inference is a virtual 
deathblow to the defendant’s case.”). 
18 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341. 
19 See, e.g., Brief for the Association of Patent Law Firms as Amicus Curiae at 
*3, Knorr-Bremse (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 02-1256), available at 
2003 WL 23200560; Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Patent Foundation at *12, 
Knorr-Bremse (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 02-1256), available at 2003 
WL 23200569.  
20 See Steve Seidenberg, Patent Ruling May Boost IP Boutiques, 3 No. 39 
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2 (October 1, 2004) (“Many expect that the court’s en banc 
ruling in Knorr-Bremse … will simplify patent infringement suits, improve the 
relationship between patent counsel and their clients, and give boutique patent 
law firms a leg up in their competition with large general-practice firms.”). 
21 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1352 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-
in-part). 
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be told whether or not counsel was consulted (albeit without any inference 
as to the nature of the advice received) as part of the totality of the 
circumstances relevant to the question of willful infringement.”22  Finally, 
commentators have questioned how potential infringers can avoid a finding 
of willfulness without an opinion of counsel.23   
¶5 This iBrief will address these uncertainties created by the Knorr-
Bremse decision.  It will begin by tracing the historical development of 
adverse inference.  The iBrief will then present the Knorr-Bremse decision 
and examine the effects of the decision on current patent law.  Finally, the 
iBrief addresses two specific questions left unanswered by the Federal 
Circuit’s decision: (1) May the plaintiff inform the fact-finder that the 
alleged infringer failed to consult legal counsel? (2) How can potential 
infringers avoid a finding of willful infringement in the absence of 
obtaining an opinion from legal counsel?   The iBrief concludes that fact-
finders may still be informed of the failure by potentially infringing parties 
to consult counsel, but potential infringers may rebut an allegation of willful 
infringement, despite the absence of an opinion from counsel, by 
demonstrating that they made a good faith effort not to infringe. 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ADVERSE INFERENCE 
¶6 The adverse inference doctrine developed during the formative 
years of the Federal Circuit.  Early on, the court recognized that a potential 
infringer “has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether 
or not he is infringing” when he has “actual notice” of another inventor’s 
patent rights.24  Originally, the court held that fulfillment of this duty 
depended on the potential infringer obtaining “competent legal advice from 
counsel” before initiating any potentially infringing activity.25  However, in 
subsequent decisions the court relaxed the requirement to consult counsel in 
every case, stating fulfillment of the “affirmative duty will normally entail 
the obtaining of competent legal counsel before infringing or continuing to 
infringe.”26   Yet, while proof of competent legal advice may provide 
evidence a potential infringer fulfilled his duty of care, it does not act as a 
                                                     
22 Id. at 1346-47. 
23 See, e.g., Marcus S. Friedman and Barry J. Marenberg, A Sharp Turn in the IP 
Highway: The Federal Circuit Redefines Willful Patent Infringement, 178 N.J. 
L.J. 29 (Oct. 4, 2004); Doug Elliot, Putting the Brakes on Adverse Inference, 
9/27/2004 TEX. LAW. 29 (Sept. 27, 2004). 
24 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that an example of actual notice includes the results of a 
patent search). 
25 Id. at 1390. 
26 Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (emphasis added). 
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complete bar to a finding of willful infringement.27  Likewise, failure to 
obtain any legal opinion does not necessarily create a mandatory finding of 
willfulness, so long as the potential infringer had no knowledge of any 
existing patent rights.28  Instead of adopting one of these pro se rules 
regarding legal advice, the court reasoned a finding of willful infringement 
should not be based on a single failure on the part of the defendant, but 
rather on the “totality of the circumstances presented.”29 
¶7 Against this backdrop, the Federal Circuit introduced the doctrine 
of adverse inference in Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford 
Co.30  While that court did not ultimately apply the adverse inference 
doctrine, it did suggest that failing to present any opinion from counsel at 
trial “may indeed lead to negative inferences.”31  The Federal Circuit first 
applied adverse inference in Kloster Speedsteel v. Crucible.32  In that case 
evidence suggested the defendant knew its “high speed” tool steel would 
infringe the plaintiff’s patent,33 but proceeded to import and sell the 
infringing steel anyway.34  Adhering to prior precedent, the court applied 
the “totality of the circumstances” test in deciding the issue of willfulness.35  
One component of the test was the defendant’s failure to assert “it sought 
advice of counsel when notified of the allowed claims and [the plaintiff’s] 
warning or at any time before it began this litigation.”36  According to the 
court, the defendant’s “silence on the subject, in alleged reliance on the 
attorney-client privilege, would warrant the conclusion that it either 
obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its importation 
and sale of the accused products would be an infringement of valid U.S. 
patents.”37  In this particular case the court’s decision to challenge the 
defendant’s reliance on attorney-client privilege almost certainly resulted 
                                                     
27 Cent. Soya Co., Inc. v. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(“While we recognize that counsel’s opinion on validity is evidence to be 
weighed towards a determination of good faith, it is not dispositive.”). 
28 King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
29 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390. 
30 Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the 
Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 80 (2001) 
(citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 
(Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
31 Id. at 80 (quoting Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d at 628.). 
32 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
33 Id. at 1570. 
34 Id. at 1580 (“Stora proceeded with its infringement on the assumption, as 
stated in the memorandum and found by the district court, that the patents were 
valid and would be infringed.”). 
35 Id. at 1579. 
36 Id. at 1580. 
37 Id.  
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from the skeptical nature of the defendant’s defense.  Yet adverse inference 
was not an anomaly relegated to this particular instance, for it has since 
become a major part of Federal Circuit jurisprudence. 
¶8 Perhaps recognizing the serious implications of abrogating the 
attorney-client privilege, the Federal Circuit clarified the application of 
adverse inference in a subsequent case.  In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,38 
the court opined that “the weight that may fairly be placed on the presence 
or absence of an exculpatory opinion of counsel has varied with the 
circumstances of each case, and has not been amenable to development of a 
rigorous rule.”39  The court thus implied that a finding of adverse inference 
would only be appropriate under certain fact patterns.40  Turning to the case 
before it, the court determined the defendant had infringed the plaintiff’s 
patent.41  However, despite the defendant’s claim of attorney-client 
privilege and refusal to present an opinion of counsel, the court refused to 
impose a finding of willful infringement.42  
¶9 In other cases, the court continued to apply adverse inference.  In 
Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co.,43 the court endorsed the 
doctrine of adverse inference stating, “[w]here the infringer fails to 
introduce an exculpatory opinion of counsel at trial, a court must be free to 
infer that either no opinion was obtained, or if an opinion were obtained, it 
was contrary to the infringer’s desire to initiate or continue its use of a 
patentee’s invention.”44  As in Kloster, the defendant in Fromson was found 
liable for willful infringement.45  
II. THE KNORR-BREMSE DECISION 
¶10 The contrasting findings in Rite-Hite and Fromson demonstrate that 
the Federal Circuit did not uniformly apply the adverse inference doctrine.  
Furthermore, the application of adverse inference varied greatly by 
jurisdiction.46  Coupled with these inconsistencies in the doctrine’s 
                                                     
38 819 F.2d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
39 Id. at 1125. 
40 Id. (“Although in appropriate circumstances this court has upheld the drawing 
of adverse inferences on the question of willfulness, we have observed that 
“[t]here is no per se rule that an opinion letter from patent counsel will 
necessarily preclude a finding of willful infringement””). 
41 Id. at 1124. 
42 Id. at 1125. 
43 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
44 Id. at 1572-73. 
45 Id. 
46 See Lori Goldstein, et al., Federal Circuit Re-evaluates Adverse Inference 
Rule, 15 NO. 12 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 12, 12 (2003) (observing that the District 
Court of the Northern District of Ohio declined to apply adverse inference when 
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application, the concept of forcing litigants to waive the attorney-client 
privilege faced serious opposition from various attorneys’ groups47 and led 
to the proliferation of vague and unhelpful legal advice.48  In response to 
these criticisms the Federal Circuit decided to re-hear Knorr-Bremse en 
banc in order to re-evaluate the propriety of adverse inference.49 
A. Knorr-Bremse Background       
¶11 Knorr-Bremse, the plaintiff company, developed a particularly 
effective type of air disk brake for use with large commercial vehicles.50  
Based in Germany, Knorr-Bremse marketed its air disk brakes primarily to 
European truck companies.51  Recognizing the potential market for air disk 
brakes in the United States, Dana, an American corporation, and Haldex, a 
Swedish company, the alleged infringers, agreed to collaborate to 
manufacture and sell an air disk brake in America.52  Eventually, Dana and 
Haldex developed the Mark II and began installing them on some large 
commercial vehicles in the United States.53  Upon learning of the Mark II, 
Knorr-Bremse filed an infringement suit against Haldex in European court 
and shortly thereafter filed an infringement suit against Dana and Haldex in 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.54 
¶12 In the district court, Knorr-Bremse moved for summary judgment 
for literal infringement55 by the Mark II brake.56  After a hearing the district 
                                                                                                                       
a defendant refused to disclose a patent opinion, citing attorney-client privilege 
(citing W.L. Gore & Assocs. Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1628 (N.D. 
Ohio 1989)). 
47 See, e.g., Corrected Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 
at *2-6, Knorr-Bremse (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 02-1256), available at 
2003 WL 23200567; Brief for Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual Property 
Law Association at *2-3, Knorr-Bremse (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 02-
1256), available at 2003 WL 23200554. 
48 Robert P. Taylor & Katharine L. Altemus, But the Lawyers Said it was Okay 
… Revisiting the Role of Legal Opinions in Patent Litigation, 801 PLI/PAT 761, 
763 (2004). 
49 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Literal infringement is where an accused product or process contains all the 
elements described in the claims of another existing patent.  ROBERT PATRICK 
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 882 (3rd ed. 2002).  
56 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342. 
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court granted the motion for summary judgment.57  The court also explored 
the issue of willful infringement.  Haldex claimed it consulted both 
European and United States patent counsel regarding the Knorr-Bremse 
patent.  Citing attorney-client privilege, however, Haldex refused to present 
any opinion letters.58  Dana, on the other hand, admitted to consulting no 
outside counsel, but instead relied on the opinions of Haldex.59  Since 
neither party presented any advice from counsel, the court, following prior 
Federal Circuit precedent, concluded that had such opinions been obtained 
they would have been unfavorable.60 Based on the “totality of the 
circumstances,” the court found Dana and Haldex liable for willful 
infringement.61  Both parties appealed the district court’s application of 
adverse inference and the Federal Circuit accepted the case en banc to 
reconsider the court’s opinion-letter precedent.62 
B.  The Federal Circuit’s Holding 
¶13 The Federal Circuit issued its decision in the form of answers to 
four distinct questions: 
1. When the attorney-client privilege and/or work-
product privilege is invoked by a defendant in an 
infringement suit, is it appropriate for the trier of fact 
to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful 
infringement?63 
2. When the defendant had not obtained legal advice, is it 
appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect 
to willful infringement?64 
3. If the court concludes that the law should be changed, 
and the adverse inference withdrawn as applied to this 
case, what are the consequences for this case?65 
4. Should the existence of a substantial defense to 
infringement be sufficient to defeat liability for willful 




60 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342. 
61 Id.  
62 Elliot, supra note 23, at 1. 
63 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344. 
64 Id. at 1345. 
65 Id. at 1346. 
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infringement even if no legal advice has been 
secured?66 
¶14 In response to question one, the court held no adverse inference 
should be drawn when the attorney-client privilege is invoked.67  While the 
court still recognized the “duty to respect the law is undiminished,” the 
court determined “the inference that withheld opinions are adverse to the 
client’s actions can distort the attorney-client relationship, in derogation of 
the foundations of that relationship.”68   Every amicus brief agreed with the 
court on this question, arguing defendants “should never have to waive the 
[attorney-client or work product] privilege to avoid being subject to adverse 
infringement.”69 
¶15 In answer to question two, the court held that no adverse inference 
should result from the mere failure to consult counsel.70  The court, 
however, did continue to support the notion that potential infringers have 
“an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent 
rights of others.”71  The court’s holding appears to have been greatly 
influenced by several amici curiae,72 only one of which advocated adverse 
inference for failure to obtain legal counsel.73  The amicus briefs 
highlighted the prohibitive costs associated with consulting patent counsel 
for every “potentially adverse patent.”74 
                                                     
66 Id. at 1347. 
67 Id. at 1344. 
68 Id. 
69 Madeline F. Baer & John Dauer, Willful Patent Infringement, 804 PLI/PAT 
883, 914 (2004).  See, e.g., Corrected Brief of the American Bar Association as 
Amicus Curiae at *2-3, Knorr-Bremse (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 
02-1221, 02-1256) (quoting 01A|16D ABA Policy and Procedures Handbook p. 
363 (2003)) (“The ABA opposes a blanket rule under which the failure of 
defendant in an action for patent infringement to induce an opinion of counsel at 
trial will permit an inference to be drawn that either no opinion was obtained or, 
if an opinion was obtained, it was contrary to the accused infringer’s desire to 
initiate or continue its use of the patentee’s invention.”), available at 2003 WL 
23200567. 
70 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345. 
71 Id. at 1345-46 (quoting L.A. Gear Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 
1117, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
72 See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of United States Council for International 
Business, et. al. at *6, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. 
Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 
02-1256) (“The en banc Court should overrule this precedent because this 
principle of law places far to much emphasis on the presence of a litigation-
ready opinion in the willfulness analysis.”), available at 2003 WL 23200563. 
73 Baer & Dauer, supra note 69, at 915. 
74 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345. 
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¶16 With respect to question three, the Federal Circuit remanded the 
case to the district court to reassess the issue of willfulness without 
admitting adverse inference.75  In doing so the court recognized the 
importance of a balancing test to the finding of willful infringement, noting, 
“precedent illustrates various factors, some weighing on the side of 
culpability and some that are mitigating or ameliorating.”76 
¶17 In response to question four, the court held that the existence of a 
substantial defense to infringement would not automatically bar a finding of 
willful infringement.77  According to the court, willful infringement depends 
on the totality of the circumstances and the court has the discretion to weigh 
various factors as it sees fit.78 
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF KNORR-BREMSE 
¶18 While the Federal Circuit clearly eliminated adverse inference from 
the test for willful infringement, the court failed to clearly explain how this 
decision would affect the current state of patent law, leaving patent 
attorneys with two fundamental questions. 
A.  May the plaintiff inform the fact-finder that the alleged infringer 
failed to consult legal counsel?   
¶19 The Federal Circuit has previously acknowledged that the duty to 
consult counsel is one component of the “totality of the circumstances” and 
relevant to determining the potential infringer’s state of mind at the time of 
infringement.  In that respect the plaintiff must be allowed to inform the 
fact-finder that the alleged infringer failed to consult legal counsel. 
¶20 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Knorr-Bremse only addressed the 
issue of whether the court may instruct the fact-finder to interpret the 
defendant’s failure to present an opinion letter as indicating that any opinion 
letter so obtained by the defendant would have been negative.  The court 
never addressed whether the plaintiff could simply inform the fact-finder 
that the defendant failed to consult counsel.  However, the Federal Circuit’s 
prior jurisprudence strongly suggests a plaintiff must be allowed to inform 
the fact-finder that the defendant failed to consult legal counsel in any case 
where the defendant had a duty to consult counsel.79  
                                                     
75 Id. at 1346. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 1347. 
78 Id.  
79 See, e.g., Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 
1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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¶21 Generally, inventors do not have a duty to investigate whether each 
product they develop has been patented because the costs associated with 
such due diligence may be prohibitive.80  However, once an inventor gains 
knowledge of a patent relating to his device, the costs of determining 
infringement decrease dramatically.81  Along these lines the Federal Circuit 
adopted the affirmative duty rule.  In Knorr-Bremse the court continued to 
adhere to the principle that a potential infringer “has an affirmative duty to 
exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing” when he has 
knowledge of prior patents his product may infringe.82  While the court 
originally required defendants to consult legal counsel in order to satisfy 
their duty,83 the court currently only requires a defendant to consult legal 
counsel if the totality of the circumstances warrants it.84  Consequently, a 
blanket rule punishing potential infringers for failing to obtain legal 
counsel, regardless of whether the circumstances require consultation, is 
overly inclusive.85   
¶22 In Knorr-Bremse, the court seemed to recognize the over-inclusive 
nature of the existing rule.  The court stressed that willful infringement 
hinges on “whether a prudent person would have sound reason to believe 
that the patent was not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable, and would 
be so held if litigated.”86  In judging the defendant’s reasonableness the 
court has repeatedly stated it must consider the “totality of the 
circumstances,”87 one of which is whether the defendant reasonably 
investigated the validity of any infringement claims.88   
¶23 The question for any defendant becomes what is a reasonable 
investigation?  In certain cases where the inventor lacks any background in 
patent law, the only reasonable course of conduct may be to consult a patent 
attorney.  In contrast, in cases where the inventor is well educated on patent 
law, perhaps a large corporation that deals with patent issues on a regular 
basis, a reasonable investigation may not include consulting counsel.  
                                                     
80 Lee & Cogswell, supra note 17, at 420.   
81 Id. 
82 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345 (citing Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 
1389-90). 
83 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390. 
84 Rolls-Royce, 800 F.2d at 1109. 
85 See, e.g., Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572-73 (making an adverse inferrence that 
had the defendant consulted counsel the outcome would have been negative 
despite failing to expressly find whether the defendant disregarded its duty to 
consult counsel). 
86 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1347 (quoting SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. 
Labs. Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
87 Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1579. 
88 CPG Prods. Corp. v. Pegasus Luggage, Inc., 776 F.2d 1007, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 
1985). 
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However, in either case, whether the defendant consulted patent counsel 
may be helpful in explaining the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the 
infringing activity.  Thus, in the interest of considering the “totality of the 
circumstances,” it appears that the fact-finder must be told whether the 
defendant consulted counsel because it is one component of the 
circumstances and may aid the jury in determining intent.   
¶24 While some may think this outcome simply sounds like adverse 
inference in disguise, the results are much more just and favorable for the 
defendant.  Pre-Knorr-Bremse, if the defendant failed to present an opinion 
of counsel at trial, the judge would instruct the jury that the defendant failed 
to consult counsel and that an opinion letter, had it actually been obtained, 
would have been against the defendant’s interests.  Not only does the jury 
learn that the defendant failed to pursue the wise course of action of 
consulting counsel, but it is also instructed to presume that any legal 
counsel, if consulted, would have said that the defendant was guilty of 
infringement.  Under such circumstances, it becomes almost impossible for 
the defendant to win the trial.89  Post-Knorr-Bremse, however, the plaintiff 
at most merely instructs the jury that the defendant failed to consult counsel.  
The defendant then would have an opportunity to rebut the plaintiff’s 
charge of willfulness and explain why he did not consult counsel.  Unlike 
the old system, there would be no presumption of guilt and the defendant 
would be permitted an opportunity to mount an actual defense.   
B.  How can potential infringers avoid a finding of willful 
infringement in the absence of obtaining an opinion from legal 
counsel?   
¶25 In order to avoid a finding of willfulness, the defendant must 
convince the court that he did not intentionally infringe the plaintiff’s 
patent.  A good faith intent, absent an opinion from counsel, can be difficult 
to prove but not impossible.  The defendant must present concrete evidence 
showing he was aware of the plaintiff’s patent and took constructive action 
not to infringe it.  
1. The Federal Circuit’s definition of willfulness  
¶26 Before turning to how the defendant may demonstrate a good faith 
intent not to infringe, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the 
concept of willfulness.  The Federal Circuit has defined willfulness as a 
                                                     
89 In theory, findings by the court are supposed to be based on the “totality of the 
circumstances.”  However, a finding based on adverse inference has seemingly 
always carried greater weight than the other factors and resulted in an almost 
automatic finding of willful infringement.  See, e.g., Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1579; 
Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572-73. 
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form of mens rea.90  In other words, willfulness requires a showing of 
deliberate or intentional infringement.  The Federal Circuit has stated that in 
order “[t]o willfully infringe a patent, the patent must exist and one must 
have knowledge of it.”91  Potential infringers may obtain actual knowledge 
of a patent in a variety of ways, including receiving an offer to license, 
receiving a notice of infringement, or discussing a competing product with a 
manufacturer.92  Constructive knowledge is also possible if the infringer has 
knowledge of a product with a patent number affixed.93   
¶27 As the court established in Kloster,94 and reaffirmed in Knorr-
Bremse,95 a finding of willful infringement should be based on the “totality 
of the circumstances.”  The court must “look at exculpatory evidence as 
well as evidence tending to show deliberate disregard of [the patentee’s] 
rights.”96  Ultimately, the “court must consider factors that render [the] 
defendant’s conduct more culpable, as well as factors that are mitigating or 
ameliorating.”97  Although the relevant factors may vary greatly depending 
on the case, the Federal Circuit has provided some guidance through its 
prior case law as to some of the factors it may consider.  One factor that 
clearly weighs into the willfulness determination is whether the alleged 
infringer consulted legal counsel.98  Consulting legal counsel, however, 
does not automatically compel a finding against or for willful infringement, 
but is merely one factor the court must consider.99     
¶28 In CPG Products Corp. v Pegasus Luggage, Inc.,100 the court 
identified three inquiries relevant to determining willfulness: (1) whether 
the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff’s patent, (2) whether the 
defendant reasonably investigated the validity of any infringement claims, 
and (3) whether the defendant took remedial action upon learning of the 
potential infringement.101  The court expanded upon the willfulness inquiry 
in Bott v. Four Star Corp.102 by asking “whether the infringer deliberately 
copied the ideas or design of another” and how “the infringer[] [behaved] as 
                                                     
90 Heffan, supra note 6, at 119. 
91 State Indus., Inc. v. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
92 Heffan, supra note 6, at 123. 
93 Id. 
94 Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1579. 
95 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341. 
96 Lee & Cogswell, supra note 17, at 404 (citing Comark Comm., Inc. v. Harris 
Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
97 Read, 970 F.2d at 826. 
98 Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1579. 
99 Id.  
100 776 F.2d 1007 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
101 Id. at 1015. 
102 807 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 6 
a party to the litigation.”103  Furthermore, in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,104 
the court noted that the factors in the previous cases were not “all inclusive” 
and recognized five additional factors courts could consider when 
determining willfulness: “(1) Defendant’s size and financial condition; (2) 
Closeness of the case; (3) Duration of the defendant’s misconduct; … (5) 
Defendant’s motivation for harm; and (6) Whether defendant attempted to 
conceal its misconduct.”105  Potential defendants must be cognizant of all 
these factors because they may influence the factual determination. 
¶29 Generally the defendant in a willful infringement suit will argue 
that he created his invention with a “good faith belief that it did not 
infringe” the plaintiff’s patent.106  Based on this defense, a finding of 
willfulness will typically turn on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of 
the infringement.107  Defendants, however, run into difficulty proving their 
good faith intent because their state of mind is entirely within their own 
possession.108  An opinion of counsel can be effective in proving a 
defendant’s state of mind109 and, based on prior Federal Circuit decisions, 
seems to be the preferred method of evidence for proving intent.110   
¶30 However, as the Federal Circuit has previously noted, the weight 
placed on the presence or absence of an exculpatory opinion varies based on 
the circumstances.111  Ultimately, willfulness must be determined based on 
the “totality of the circumstances” and not just one individual factor.112  
While Federal Circuit precedent is heavily populated by decisions turning 
on the presence of opinions of counsel, the court has issued a few decisions 
that found the defendant not liable for willful infringement despite the lack 
of an opinion of counsel.  These cases provide insights into how potential 
infringers may prove a good faith intent not to infringe despite the failure to 
obtain an opinion of counsel. 
 
                                                     
103 Id. at 1572. 
104 970 F.2d at 816. 
105 Id. at 827.  Omitted in the above list of factors is “(4) Remedial action by the 
defendant,” which is a duplicate of one of three factors in the test articulated in 
CPG Products Corp.  See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
106 Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 85-86. 
107 Taylor & Altemus, supra note 48, at 765. 
108 Id. 
109 Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 70. 
110 Taylor & Altemus, supra note 48, at 768. 
111 Rite-Hite, 819 F.2d at 1125. 
112 See e.g., Mach. Corp. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(holding that a finding of willfulness by the district court based solely on the 
absence of an opinion letter was improper).  
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2. Proving a good faith intent not to infringe 
¶31 One of the more common ways a defendant can demonstrate its 
good faith intent is to provide evidence that he tried to “design around” an 
already existing patent.113  According to the Federal Circuit, the ability to 
design around an existing patent is a benefit of a patent system that ensures 
a “steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.”114  Because the ability to 
design around is so valuable, the Federal Circuit has stated that “it should 
not be discouraged by punitive damages.”115  In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley, 
for example, the defendant refused to present any opinion of counsel at trial, 
citing attorney-client privilege.116  Despite the absence of legal counsel on 
the record, the court still determined the defendant did not willfully infringe 
the plaintiff’s patent.117  According to the court, the factors influencing its 
decision were “that the infringer’s copying of a certain feature was not exact 
and that the infringer’s stated aim was to ‘design around’ the patentee’s 
claims.”118 
¶32 Similarly, in Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., the defendant 
failed to obtain an opinion of counsel.119  Once again, the court was 
favorably influenced by the defendant’s attempt to “design around” the 
original invention.120  The defendant provided evidence that engineers 
discussed whether its invention infringed the plaintiff’s, as well as evidence 
indicating the defendant was conscious of the need not to infringe.121  This 
evidence was sufficient to convince the court that the defendant “did not 
intentionally copy the plaintiff’s patent.”122 
¶33 Providing evidence that demonstrates an attempt to “design around” 
an existing patent is not the only way to avoid willful infringement liability.  
In Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Lomb, Inc.,123 the defendant did not produce an 
                                                     
113 At times members of the Federal Circuit have challenged the validity of the 
experimental use exception, see Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring), which could have a potential 
impact on the acceptability of attempts to design around if unlicensed copies are 
utilized for that process. 
114 Lee & Cogswell, supra note 17, at 405 (citing Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control 
USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
115 Id. 
116 819 F.2d at 1125. 
117 Id. at 1126. 
118 Lee & Cogswell, supra note 17, at 406 (quoting Rite-Hite, 819 F.2d at 1125). 
119 800 F.2d at 1109-10. 
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 209 F. Supp. 2d 348 (D. Del. 2002). 
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opinion of counsel at trial.124 Nonetheless, the court did not find the 
defendant liable for willful infringement because the defendant abandoned 
its infringing action immediately upon learning of the defendant’s patent.125               
¶34 The common denominator in all these cases is that the defendants 
were capable of presenting sufficient evidence of their good faith effort not 
to infringe to convince the court that their infringing actions were not 
intentional.  This is likely the key to surviving any willful infringement 
action.  While an opinion letter may be the easiest and most accepted way to 
accomplish this task, it is not entirely necessary to avoid a finding of willful 
infringement if other external factors sufficiently demonstrate the 
unintentional nature of the infringement.   
CONCLUSION 
¶35 While the total impact of Knorr-Bremse on patent litigation remains 
unclear, a few results appear certain.  First, a failure to produce an opinion 
of counsel does not create an adverse inference against the defendant.  
Second, potential infringers should be wary of the factors that contribute to 
the “totality of the circumstances,” realizing that one factor is whether all 
notifications of infringement by competitors have been reasonably 
investigated.  In certain cases reasonable investigation may require 
consultaing patent counsel.  Third, whether a court finds willfulness 
depends greatly upon the circumstances of each case.  What factors will be 
examined and how heavily each factor will be weighted is left to the court’s 
discretion.  Potential infringers, when deciding whether the required duty of 
care includes a responsibility to consult outside patent counsel, must 
examine whether their current conduct convincingly demonstrates a desire 
to avoid infringement.  
      
    
   
  
 
    
 
                                                     
124 Marcia H. Sundeen & George Langendorf, Willfulness: Opinions, Discovery 
and Waiver, 804 PLI/PAT 919, 928 (2004).   
125 Id.  
